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The European Commission’s discretion as to the adoption of 
Article 9 commitment decisions: Lessons from Alrosa 
 






Introduced  by  Article  9  of  Regulation  1/2003,  commitment  decisions  represent  a  tool  – 
alternative to Article 7 infringement decisions – available to the European Commission in 
order to ensure an effective implementation of the EU antitrust rules. Over the last few years 
there has been an increased recourse to commitment decisions in antitrust cases. This paper 
explores the reasons  for  the apparent  success  of  this  new instrument  and anticipates  the 
consequences  of  the  recent  Alrosa  judgment  rendered  by  the  European  Court  of  Justice, 
which limits the judicial review of commitment decisions to the manifest incorrectness of the 
Commission’s  assessment.  The  paper  concludes  that,  in  light  of  the  extent  of  the 
Commission’s discretion as to the adoption of commitment decisions defined by the Court in 
Alrosa,  the  observed  trend  seems  likely  to  continue.  In  particular,  given  the  generous 
boundaries set by the Court to the Commission’s discretionary power, hopes of avoiding 
system failures in commitment decisions seem actually to be pinned on the Commission’s self-
restraint more than on the potential for control by the Luxembourg Courts. 
 
Key words: Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003, commitment 
decisions,  infringement  decisions,  Commission’s  discretionary  power,  principle  of 
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Content: 1. Introduction – 2. The mechanism of Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 – 3. The 
extent of the Commission’s discretion in the Alrosa ruling of the ECJ – 4. Conclusion 
 
1.  Introduction 
Introduced  by  Article  9  of  Regulation  1/2003,
1 commitment decisions represent a tool  – 
alternative to Article 7 infringement decisions – available to the European Commission in 
order to fulfill the objective of applying the European antitrust rules effectively. There has 
been an increased recourse to Article 9 decisions
2 in antitrust cases over the last few years: the 
Commission adopted two in 2008, five in 2009 and six in 2010.
3 
The increasing popularity of commitment decisions is not surprising if one considers that, 
under the old implementation system of the European antitrust rules, the Commission used to 
close  cases  by  way  of  informal  settlements  with  the  undertakings  under  investigation.
4 
Furthermore, Article 9 decisions are designed to be even more appealing to the Commission 
in that commitments, as opposed to informal  settlements, are made legally binding on the 
undertakings offering them and are therefore enforceable. 
However, on closer inspection, the introduction of commitment decisions does not seem to 
represent an attempt to regulate enforcement practice which is v oid of legal effects. The 
Commission still continues, now as before entry into force of Regulation 1/2003, to settle  
 
                                                 
1   Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ L 1, 4.1.2003), in force since 1 May 2004 replacing 
Council Regulation No 17/62. With effect from 1 December 2009, Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty have 
become  Articles  101  and  102,  respectively,  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union 
(“TFEU”). The two sets of provisions are in substance identical. 
2   “Article 9” and “commitment” decisions are used as synonyms in this paper. The same applies to “Article 7” 
and “infringement” decisions mentioned infra in the text. 
3
  Data  collected  from  the  website  of  the  Commission‟s  Directorate-General  for  Competition,  selecting 
“commitments  decision”  from  the  “document  type”  scroll-down  menu  at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?clear=1&policy_area_id=1.  The  result  list  (latest 
access on 24 March 2011) omits the four commitments decisions adopted on 13 September 2007 in Cases 
COMP/39.140  to  39.143.  These  four  decisions  (see    press  release  IP/07/1332  at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do)  also  figure  in  the  annex  to  the  Commission  Staff  Working  Paper 
accompanying  the  Report  on  the  functioning  of  Regulation  1/2003  (SEC(2009)  574  final,  29.4.2009), 
hereinafter “Staff Working Paper”. 
4
  It has been calculated that cases closed by informal settlements  actually accounted for around 90% of all 
competition cases closed under Regulation 17/62  : Van Bael & Bellis, Competition Law of the European 
Community, 4th edition, Kluwer, 2005, p. 1136, also quoted by Bellamy & Child, European Community 





5  provided  it  considers  such  a  solution  appropriate  in  its  antitrust 
enforcement action. 
This paper explores, on the one  hand, the reasons for the apparent success of commitment 
decisions,
6 and anticipates, on the other, the consequences of the recent judgment rendered by 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the  Alrosa litigation,
7 which defines the extent of the 
Commission‟s discretion as to the adoption of Article 9 decisions and the limits of judicial 
review. 
 
2.  The mechanism of Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 
A correct understanding of the context in which the Commission operates when it launches 
the special procedure potentially leading to the adoption of a commitment decision is crucial 
for the purposes of this paper.
8 Accordingly, the analysis that follows is based on what can be 
reasonably understood as the Commission‟s perspective throughout its enforcement of the 
European antitrust rules. 
2.1.  Procedural steps 
Article 9 provides first and foremost that the Commission may not opt for the commitment 
route unless it “intends to adopt a decision requiring that an infringement be brought to an 
end”. The commitment solution may therefore be taken into consideration, if ever, only from 
the time when the Commission would be able, on the basis of an appropriate investigation, to 
make an informed choice about proceeding to a formal finding of an infringement through an 
Article 7 decision. 
In this scenario, according to Article 9, the Commission is entitled to accept the commitments 
offered  by  the  relevant  undertakings  “to  meet  the  concerns  expressed  to  them  by  the 
Commission  in  its  preliminary  assessment”.  The  Commission‟s  preliminary  assessment  is 
then intended to inform the undertakings under investigation of the concerns over competition 
raised by their conduct, so that commitments may be proposed. 
It is understood, in line with the objective of enhanced administrative efficiency of Regulation 
1/2003
9 and all the more so after the intervention of the ECJ in  Alrosa,
10 that the preliminary 
assessment  pursuant  to  Article  9  is  not  supposed  to  offer  the  same  level  of  detail  as  a 
                                                 
5
  For a recent example of preliminary investigations closed without the need to open formal proceedings, see 
press release IP/10/1175 at http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do, where the Commission welcomed the new 
iPhone policies announced by Apple. Formal antitrust proceedings were commenced against Apple in 2007 
in cases COMP/39154 PO/iTunes and COMP/39174 Which/iTunes, before the Commission decided to close 
them in light of Apple‟s announcement that it would equalise prices for downloading songs from its iTunes 
online store in Europe (see press release IP/08/22). 
6
  The Commission has expressed its satisfaction by stating: “Experience so far indicates that the instrument of 
commitment decisions has functioned well”, Staff Working Paper, § 102. 
7
  Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 29 June 2010, Case C-441/07 P, European Commission v Alrosa 
Company Ltd (OJ C 234/3, 28.8.2010), hereinafter “ECJ Alrosa”. 
8
  The special procedure referred to consists essentially of the preliminary assessment and the market test, 
unknown to Article 7 infringement decisions, see infra in the text. 
9
  See in particular the abolition of the notification of agreements to the Commission for individual exemption 
pursuant to Article 101(3). 
10




statement of objections for the purposes of Article 7.
11 It follows logically that a statement of 
objections always meets the requirements of a preliminary assessment within the meaning of 
Article 9.
12 
Should  commitment  negotiations  opened  on  the  basis  of  a  preliminary  assessment  be 
unsuccessful, the Commission may not proceed right away to the adoption of an Article 7 
decision. Before doing so, the Commission would in fact be required to draft a statement of 
objections  and  send  it  to  the  undertakings  in  question.  Therefore,  the  objectives  of 
administrative efficiency and procedural economy underlying Regulation 1/2003 would push 
the Commission to explore with the undertakings concerned the room for possible satisfactory 
commitments before drafting a preliminary assessment in the first place.
13 
In  the  Coca-Cola  case,  a  few  days  elapsed  between  the  adoption  of  the  preliminary 
assessment (15 October 2004) and the submission of commitments in response (19 October 
2004).
14 It is thus evident that sometimes the negotiations over the proposed commitments 
may take place de facto well before the notification of the preliminary assessment. Still, the 
preliminary assessment plays a fundamental role in the Article 9 architecture, based on the 
relationship between final commitments and competition concerns, for which it represents the 
one and only source, not least for the purposes of judicial review.
15 
Once “convinced that the commitments offered prima facie address the competition concerns 
identified”,
16 the Commission gives interested third parties the opportunity to submit their 
observations by publishing in the EU Official Journal a notice (“market test notice”) including 
the main content of the proposed commitments along with a concise summary of the case.
17 
Should the comments received in response to the market test so require, the Commission then 
confronts  the  undertaking  concerned  with  these  comments  before  making  the  final 
commitments binding. 
                                                 
11
  According to some authors, “Art.9 is conceived as a mechanism to bringing administrative procedures, rather 
than infringements, to an end”, O. Armengol and A. Pascual,  Some reflections on Article 9 commitment 
decisions in the light of the Coca-Cola case, E.C.L.R. 2006, 27(3), p. 126. 
12
  Several commitment decisio ns have actually been adopted that make binding commitments offered to 
address competition concerns expressed in a statement of objections. Of these statements of objections, some 
were issued before (e.g., Case COMP/38.173 Football Association Premier Leag ue), and some after (e.g., 
Case COMP/39.530 Microsoft Tying) the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003. With regard to the former, 
one author observes: “it would appear that the Article 9 procedure has been used to some extent as a way of 
clearing the backlog of difficult „legacy‟ cases from the days of Regulation 17/62”, R. Whish, Commitment 
Decisions  under  Article  9  of  the  EC  Modernisation  Regulation:  Some  Unanswered  Questions,  in  Liber 
Amicorum in Honour of Sven Norberg (2006, Bruylant, Brussels), p. 564. 
13
  “Once DG Competition is convinced of the genuine willingness of the undertakings to propose commitments 
effectively  suited  to  address  the  competition  concerns,  a  Preliminary  Assessment  will  be  issued”,  Best 
Practices on the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, hereinafter “Best Practices”, 
available  at  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2010_best_practices/best_practice_articles.pdf,  § 
107 (last consulted on 24 March 2011). 
14
  Case COMP/39.116, closed by commitment decision of 22 June 2005. 
15
  C.J.  Cook  qualifies  instead  the  preliminary  assessment,  at  least  in  some  cases,  as  “a  largely  symbolic 
document that is  not a central element of the  Article 9  process”,  Commitment Decisions: The Law and 
Practice under Article 9, World Competition 29(2), 2006, p. 215. 
16
  Best Practices, § 114 (emphasis in the original). 
17




As the Commission indicates, yet without expressing any preference, the commitments which 
undertakings may offer to address its competition concerns can be behavioural or structural in 
nature.
18 So far, behavioural commitments are predominant in the Commission‟s output of 
Article 9 decisions.
19 Regulation 1/2003 remains silent under Article 9 on the nature of the 
commitments, whereas it dictates a rule under Article 7 as to the nature of the remedies that 
the Commission can impose to bring an infringement of the European antitrust rules to an end. 
In that respect, clear priority is given to behavioural remedies and the application of structural 
ones subordinated to situations where “there is no equally effective behavioural remedy or 
where  any  equally  effective  behavioural  remedy  would  be  more  burdensome  for  the 
undertaking concerned”.
20 
Although technically possible by means of a broad interpretation of the law, the extension of 
this priority rule from the nature of the remedies to the nature of the commitments does not 
seem to be supported by the doctrine.
21 Nor does the ECJ in its Alrosa ruling appear to limit 
the Commission‟s discretion as to the nature of the commitments to be made binding on the 
undertakings concerned.
22 
2.2.  The scope of commitment decisions 
The Commission has made clear since the early stages of the implementation of Article 9 that 
it  will  not  consider  a  commitment  solution  in  hard-core  cartel  cases.
23 This is a logical 
consequence  of  the  closing  statement  under  Recital  13  of  Regulation  1/2003  whereby 
“(c)ommitment  decisions  are  not  appropriate  in  cases  where  the  Commission  intends  to 
impose a fine”. 
Since hard-core cartels amount to the most serious infringements of the European antitrust 
rules, it follows that an effective reaction aimed at restoring legality cannot but include the 
use of fines as the most powerful instrument available to the Commission to sanction and 
deter. Irrespective of the legal value of Recital 13, should the Commission not stick to its 
words and close a hard-core cartel case by way of an Article 9 decision, this would raise most 
serious doubts in light of the ECJ ruling in Alrosa.
24 
                                                 
18
  Best Practices, § 112. 
19
  At § 97 of its 2009 Staff Working Paper, the Commission observed that it had made structural commitments 
binding on the undertakings concerned (E.ON and RWE respectively) in only two of the thirteen decisions 
adopted until then, all other com mitments being behavioural in nature. A quick overview of the Article 9 
decisions adopted since confirms this trend. 
20
  Recital 12 of Regulation 1/2003 restates the concept and elaborates further on the suitability of structural 
remedies: “Changes to the structure of an undertaking as it existed before the infringement was committed 
would only be proportionate where there is a substantial risk of a lasting or repeated infringement that derives 
from the very structure of the undertaking”. 
21
  According to J. Temple Lang, “the Commission will presumably always have a preference for commitments 
which it does not need to supervise”, Commitment decisions under Regulation 1/2003: Legal aspects of a 
new kind of competition decision, E.C.L.R. 2003, 24(8), p. 349. See also E. Wind, Remedies and sanctions in 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty, E.C.L.R. 2005, 26(12), p. 660. 
22
  See infra at paragraph 3.2. 
23
  “The Commission ... can consider such a decision if and when: ... the case is not one where a fine would be 
appropriate (this therefore excludes commitment decisions in hardcore cartel cases)”, see MEMO/04/217 of 
17 September 2004 at http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do. 
24




The  fact  that  fines  can  only  be  imposed  insofar  as  an  infringement  is  found  and  that 
commitment decisions do not establish “whether or not there has been (…) an infringement”
25 
excludes at the same time that an Article 9 decision may contain fines or make binding any 
commitment to pay money by the undertaking concerned.
26 
The question arises whether there are other situations apart from hard -core cartels where the 
Commission would not be entitled to adopt commitment decisions. By analogy, it has been 
maintained that the scope of Article 9 decisions should be limited to “less serious” cases, in 
order to save and devote resources to the pursuit and resolution of the most serious infractions 
by way of Article 7 decisions.
27 
This approach would then introduce a restriction of the Commission‟s discretion in enforcing 
the European antitrust rules, whereby the Commission should refrain from using commitment 
decisions to close serious cases, as only infringement decisions could adequately deal with 
them. It remains to be seen whether this interpretation is compatible with the ECJ‟s findings 
in Alrosa as to the extent of the discretion in question and the limits of judicial review. 
Even  before  engaging  in  that  analysis,
28  however,  it  is  hard  to  agree  with  such  an 
interpretation. Nothing in the letter of the law seems in fact to indicate the seriousness of the 
case as categorically excluding recourse to commitment decisions. Inferring this from Recital 
13  of  Regulation  1/2003,  when  it  qualifies  the  adoption  of  commitment  decisions  as 
inappropriate in cases where the Commission intends to impose a fine, does not appear 
convincing either. The conclusion that commitment decisions would not be appropriate to 
resolve the most serious competition cases, since hard -core cartels are sanctioned with fines 
and amount to the most serious breaches of the antitrust rules, is not plausible.  It is of course 
undisputed  that  Regulation  1/2003  is  designed  to  enable  the  Commission  to  focus  its 
enforcement action on the investigation of serious cases. However,  it does not follow that 
only cases where in the end an infringement has been established can be labelled as serious. 
Generally speaking, the notion of “seriousness” of a competition case is quite relative. As 
early as the initial assessment and priority setting, the Commission engages in the selection of 
those  cases  that  are  serious  enough  to  deserve  further  investigation.
29 Of these, the most 
serious cases make it to the later and crucial stage where the Commission may choose 
between the commitment or the  infringement  route, whereas the less serious cases are 
disposed of along the way. Coming to this stage normally requires that the Commission has 
devoted significant resources to the investigation of the alleged anti -competitive practice in 
question. If there are grounds for a distinction between more serious and less serious cases, 
then it is  in  relation  to the outcome of the Commission‟s investigations.  Introducing this 
                                                 
25
  Recital 13 of Regulation 1/2003. 
26
  Eddy de Smijter and Lars Kjoelbye,  The enforcement system under Regulation 1/2003, in Faull & Nikpay, 
The EC Law of Competition, Oxford 2007, § 2.121, p. 125. 
27
  Consistently with this approach , commitment decisions are degraded to the status   of a  “marginal  tool” 
available  to  the  Commission,  see  A.  Pera  and  M.  Carpagnano,  The  law  and  practice  of  commitment 
decisions: a comparative analysis, E.C.L.R. 2008, 29(12), p. 671. 
28
  See infra at paragraph 3.1. 
29
  “In this regard, DG Competition focuses its enforcement resources on cases in which it appears likely that an 
infringement could be found, in particular on cases with the most significant impact on the functioning of 
competition and risk of consumer harm, as well as on cases which are relevant with a view to defining EU 
competition policy and/or to ensuring coherent application of Articles 101 and/or 102 TFEU”, Best Practices, 




distinction at the subsequent moment when the Commission is pondering the enforcement 
benefits of an Article 9 decision rather than an Article 7 decision therefore appears incorrect. 
Recital  13  of  Regulation  1/2003  should  not  be  relied  upon  either  to  argue  that,  had  the 
Commission expressed its intention to impose a fine in the statement of objections addressed 
to the party subject to the proceedings, it would no longer be in a position to issue an Article 9 
decision. This would imply that in such circumstances the Commission could no longer depart 
from the Article 7 route, irrespective of the content of the commitments potentially offered by 
the undertaking concerned. This is not acceptable, since Article 9 is a flexible instrument 
intended to extend the range of solutions available to the Commission to solve (serious) cases. 
It  must  therefore  remain  accessible  at  any  time  before  the  adoption  of  an  infringement 
decision, provided that all requirements are met and insofar as the Commission‟s enforcement 
priorities so recommend.
30 
If only hard-core cartel cases can be reasonably excluded from the  scope of commitment 
decisions, it appears conversely that there are no situations where the Commission is under an 
obligation to adopt an Article 9 decision.
31 
Observing  the  Commission‟s  record  to  date,  several  commentators  have  identified  some 
market  sectors  that  would  benefit  considerably  from  the  swift  solution  to  competition 
concerns that commitment decisions can in principle secure. Recourse to Article 9 decisions 
would  be  particularly  welcome  in  fast-moving  technology  markets,  where  any  failure  to 
address promptly the competition problems arising out of the clash between small newcomers 
and powerful incumbents could run the risk of stifling innovation.
32 However, the energy 
sector would seem to take the lead in the Article 9 output of the Commission. 
The fact remains that the Commission is not bound to privilege a commitment over an 
infringement solution for the technology sector, the energy sector or any other because of any 
supposed “precedential value” of its Article 9 repertoire in that field. The Commission should 
be able to assess its enforcement priorities anew in each case and ultimately take a different 
route despite similarities with earlier cases. This is particularly true should the Commission‟s 
competition concerns mirror those of another case resolved by way of an Article 9 decision, 
and should the undertaking under investigation be willing to offer comparable commitments. 
Even in such circumstances, the Commission should retain the discretion whether or not to 
enter into commitment negotiations and should exercise it in accordance with its enforcement 
objectives.
33 
                                                 
30
  “(T)here is no reason why a commitment decision cannot be adopted in a case in which the Commission 
intended to impose a fine when it sent the statement of objections, but later decided that a fine was not 
necessary or justified, and the undertaking offered an adequate commitment”, J. Temple Lang, ibidem, p. 347. 
31
  The Commission has taken this position  ab  ovo:  “(t)he  Commission  is  never  obliged  to  terminate  its 
proceedings by adopting an „Article 9‟ commitment decision”, see MEMO/04/217. 
32
  See  M.  Dolmans,  T.  Graf  and  D.R.  Little,  Microsoft’s  browser  choice  commitments  and  public 
interoperability undertaking, E.C.L.R. 2010, 31(7), p. 274. By the same token, in nascent technology markets 
where the market definition is controversial and the position of market players not yet established, closing a 
potential  competition  case  informally  could  be  particularly  efficient,  especially  before  opening  formal 
proceedings.  This  would  of  course  require  a  certain  degree  of  cooperation  from  the  undertakings  under 
investigation, most likely the first-movers on the nascent market in question. 
33




3.  The extent of the Commission’s discretion in the Alrosa ruling of the ECJ 
Many points raised in the previous paragraphs as to the actual implementation of Article 9 
have an element in common in that they may question the Commission‟s discretion as to the 
adoption of a commitment decision. A closer look reveals that this discretion is actually two-
fold: the Commission exercises it first when choosing to follow the commitment route instead 
of  opting  for  an  infringement  decision,  and  second  when  measuring  the  proposed 
commitments against its competition concerns as expressed in the preliminary assessment. 
Even if in practice this can be regarded as a single exercise, given the interplay between its 
two  legs,  it  may  nonetheless  be  useful  for  the  purposes  of  this  study  to  analyse  them 
separately. 
3.1.  The first leg of the Commission’s discretion: the choice between Article 9 and 
Article 7 
On 29 June 2010, the ECJ put an end to the Alrosa litigation, delivering a judgment of capital 
importance for the future of commitment decisions. In particular, the ECJ provided guidance 
on the extent of the Commission‟s discretion and the related boundaries of judicial review, 
coming to radically different conclusions than the General Court in its first instance ruling and 
setting this aside in the appeal.
34 
With  regard  to  the  Commission‟s  discretionary  choice  between  a  commitment  and  an 
infringement decision, the ECJ emphasises expediency and procedural economy as the atout 
of Article 9 compared with Article 7 decisions.
35 This does not of course make the former 
preferable as a matter of principle. Later on in the ruling,
36 the ECJ in fact refers more 
generally to the “aims pursued” by the Commission in the enforcement of the antitrust rules. 
This reference recalls the balance struck by the Commission to determine the priorities of its 
antitrust action and resolve cases accordingly. 
As commitment decisions were conceived by the legislator as a substitute for infringement 
decisions, the Commission is actually expected to weigh these two different instruments in 
light of the circumstances of a given case before making its final choice. In this process, the 
strengths  of  one  tool  are  normally  the  weaknesses  of  the  other.  For  instance,  unlike 
commitment decisions, Article 7 decisions compensate for the more lengthy and burdensome 
procedure with the finding of an infringement and the possible imposition of fines. 
Convincingly,  after  having  listed  six  possible  ways  in  which  infringement  decisions  can 
contribute to the implementation of the European antitrust rules, one author has concluded 
that only as long as expediency and procedural economy outweigh these lost benefits can 
commitment  decisions  be  qualified  as  “optimal”  from  the  perspective  of  antitrust  
                                                 
34
  Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 11 July 2007, Case T-170/06, Alrosa v Commission (OJ C 199/37 
of 25.8.2007), hereinafter “GC Alrosa”. As from 1 December 2009, the Court of First Instance has been 
renamed the General Court. 
35
  ECJ Alrosa, § 35. 
36





37 As a corollary to this reasoning, Article 9 decisions should otherwise not be 
adopted at all. 
In Alrosa, however, the ECJ affirms that the Commission‟s assessment may be challenged 
before the Luxembourg Courts only for “manifest incorrectness”.
38 It is then clear that, for the 
purposes of judicial review, the court must not engage in a new appraisal of the situation, 
potentially substituting its own understanding of “optimal” enforcement for the Commission‟s. 
Instead,  the  court  must  limit  itself  to  ascertaining  whether  the  Commission  may  have 
committed a manifest error of assessment. This also means that Article 9 decisions possibly 
striking a less-than-optimal balance could nevertheless withstand the court's scrutiny. 
Against  this  background,  it  is  actually  quite  difficult  to  envisage  cases  where  the 
Commission‟s discretion to opt for an Article 9 rather than an Article 7 decision could be 
attacked.  As  mentioned  above,
39 it is generally accepted on the ba sis of Recital 13 of 
Regulation 1/2003 that Article 9 decisions are excluded in hard-core cartel cases.  
In the case of hard-core cartels, the most blatant breach of antitrust rules, the enforcement 
benefits originating from an infringement decision are so   overwhelming that it would be 
extremely problematic for the Commission to justify its choice of Article 9. The impact in 
terms of punishment, on the parties involved, and deterrence, on third undertakings as well, 
resulting from the combination of fines with the finding of infringement paving the way for 
damages actions could hardly be outweighed by the reasons of a more rapid solution of the 
case and the savings associated with the lighter administrative burden. Should an interested 
third party, then, lod ge an application in court against any such commitment decision, it 
would most likely have several arguments to persuade the judges that the Commission's 
assessment is manifestly flawed and that only an Article 7 decision could have resolved the 
case.
40 However, as noted above,
41 the Commission has been resolute since the entry into 
force of Regulation 1/2003 not to accept commitments in any such case and there are no hints 
that it would change its mind any time soon. 
As to the allegation that some cases are  “too serious” to accept commitments, this is most 
likely based on a misunderstanding that has dragged on since the time of the Commission‟s 
initial assessment of a case to set enforcement priorities. 
Here again, the focus should not be on the seriousness of the potential infringement, but on 
the seriousness of the case as a whole. The seriousness of an alleged infringement, to be 
                                                 
37
  W.P.J. Wils, Settlements of EU Antitrust Investigations: Commitment Decisions under Article 9 of Regulation 
No. 1/2003, World Competition 29(3), 2006, p. 349. From the same author, see also the later The Use of 
Settlements in Public Antitrust Enforcement: Objectives and Principles, World Competition 31(3), 2008, 
p. 342. Among the six possible contributions to antitrust enforcement of infringement decisions, it is worth 
remembering here how the finding of an infringement makes it easier for its victims to take action for redress. 
38
  ECJ Alrosa § 42. 
39
  See supra at paragraph 2.2. 
40
  This being true, the wording of Recital 13 could actually be retrieved to conclude that the Commission 
should  always  ensure  through  its  Article  9  production  an  “appropriate”  rather  than  an  “optimal” 
implementation of the antitrust rules, to avoid the risk of being successfully challenged in court. 
41




appraised by the Commission taking into account its “duration and extent” as well as its 
“effect on the competition situation in the Community”,
42 is not the only indicator that a case 
is  serious.  Cases  offering  the  Commission  a  unique  opportunity  to  take  a  stand  on  a 
competition policy issue or put an end to the ambiguous implementation of the antitrust rules, 
indicating the way forward, are in fact as serious as those of hard-core cartels
43 and may well 
require a swift solution for which Article 9 is, on balance, preferable to Article 7. 
There is nothing in the Alrosa ruling of the ECJ which confirms that commitment decisions 
are in principle not appropriate for serious cases. Nothing that supports the idea that an Article 
9 decision could be successfully challenged before the Luxembourg Courts on the grounds of 
the  alleged  “seriousness”  of  the  case.  Again,  the  legal  test  is  different  and  based  on  the 
“manifest incorrectness” of the Commission‟s assessment. 
Neither does the ECJ in its judgment refer to any supposed obligation for the Commission to 
take into consideration the commitments proposed by undertakings which, subject to formal 
proceedings, seek to avoid the adoption of an infringement decision. A clear-cut statement on 
this, not contested in the appeal and therefore still retaining some degree of authority, is 
instead  present  in  the  ruling  of  the  General  Court  at  first  instance  in  this  litigation.  The 
General  Court  affirmed  that  “the  Commission  is  never  obliged  under  Article  9(1)  of 
Regulation No 1/2003 to decide to make commitments binding instead of proceeding under 
Article  7  of  that  regulation”.
44 The  Commission,  continues  the  Court  under  the  same 
paragraph, “is therefore not required to give the reasons for which commitments are not in its 
view suitable to be made binding”. 
The interpretation of Regulation 1/2003 given by the Court does perfectly match, then, the 
firm position taken in that respect by the Commission since its entry into force.
45 This has 
strong repercussions, in particular, on those undertakings which, faced with a statement of 
objections from the Commission, would believe that the competition concerns raised b y their 
conduct are comparable to the situation of other parties before them, whose case was resolved 
by an Article 9 decision. 
All their efforts to offer commitments similar to those made binding, should the Commission 
be unwilling to listen this time, would be to no avail. The fact that the Commission is not even 
required to provide the arguments why commitments would not be appropriate to address its 
concerns  also  prevents  the  said  undertakings  from  challenging  on  these  grounds  the 
infringement decision  eventually  addressed  to  them.  Any  alleged  “precedential  value”  of 
Article 9 decisions, within the meaning of this study,
46 is therefore to be excluded. 
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  Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC 
Treaty (OJ C 101, 27.4.2004), hereinafter “Notice on the handling of complaints”, § 44 second indent. 
43
  In its Notice on the handling of complaints, the Commission announces its intention to focus its enforcement 
resources on cases possibly amounting to “the most serious infringements” as well as cases where it “should 
act with a view to define Community competition policy and/or to ensure coherent application of Articles 81 
or 82”, § 11. The two sets of cases are therefore different, but have the same importance for the purposes of 
antitrust enforcement. The same intention is restated by the Commission at § 12 of the Best Practices, see 
footnote 29. 
44
  GC Alrosa, § 130. 
45
  See supra at footnote 31. 
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3.2.  The  second  leg  of  the  Commission’s  discretion:  the  proportionality  of  the 
commitments 
Once the Commission has opted for the commitment route, Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 
provides  that  it  may  make  binding  on  the  undertaking  in  question  those  proposed 
commitments which meet the competition concerns expressed in the preliminary assessment. 
In this balancing exercise, as made clear by the ECJ in Alrosa, the Commission must observe 
the  ubiquitous  EU  law  principle  of  proportionality,  which  governs  the  lawfulness  of  any 
measure taken by EU institutions,  including the Commission  when acting  as  competition 
watchdog.
47 
For the purposes of Article 9, however, the tasks of the Commission in compliance with the 
principle  of  proportionality  are  “confined  to  verifying  that  the  commitments  in  question 
address the concerns it expressed to the undertakings concerned and that they have not offered 
less onerous commitments that also address those concerns adequately”.
48 In so doing, the 
Commission  is  not  required  to  take  as  a  benchmark  the  infringement  decision  it  could 
hypothetically adopt,
49 nor to solicit itself less onerous commitments.
50 
In addition to the different enforcement objectives pursued by Article 7 and Article 9 of 
Regulation 1/2003, which represent the main reason for the ECJ to reject any comparison 
between the two instruments,
51 measuring the proportionality of the commitments against a 
possible infringement decision would force the Commission to run two distinct enforcement 
actions in parallel. Not only would the Commission sit at the negotiating table to discuss 
appropriate commitments with the undertaking co ncerned, but it would also be required to 
think separately of the suitable infringement decision that it would adopt au cas où. 
This is not acceptable, as it would adversely impact on the enforcement efficiencies – speed 
and administrative savings – produced by the recourse to the Article 9 procedure, which had 
made  the  envisaged  adoption  of  a  commitment  decision  preferable  to  an  infringement 
decision. The consideration that, actually until the very adoption of the Article 9 decision,
52 
nothing would prevent the Commission from reverting to the Article 7 solution, so that it  
would anyway be advisable to devote resources to its progress, is misplaced. What is relevant 
                                                 
47
  Despite not being expressly referred to under Article 9, the application of the principle of proportionality to 
commitment decisions, invoked by the applicant and acknowledged by the Commission, has never been 
contested during the Alrosa litigation. The actual extent of the Commission‟s obligations descending from 
the observance of that principle, and therefore the scope of the Commission‟s discretion as to the adoption of 
Article 9 decisions, was instead highly controversial. 
48
  ECJ Alrosa, § 41. 
49
  “There is therefore no reason why the measure which could possibly be imposed in the context of Article 7 of 
Regulation No 1/2003 should have to serve as a reference for the purpose of assessing the extent of the 
commitments accepted under Article 9 of the regulation, or why anything going beyond that measure should 
automatically be regarded as disproportionate”, ECJ Alrosa, § 47. 
50
  “(T)he  Commission  is  not  required  itself  to  seek  out  less  onerous  or  more  moderate  solutions  than  the 
commitments offered to it”, ECJ Alrosa, § 61. 
51
  Article 7 aims to put an end to the infringement that has been found to exist, whereas Article 9 aims to 
address the Commission‟s concerns following its preliminary assessment, see ECJ Alrosa, § 46. 
52
  “It  is  submitted  ...  that  the  relevant  moment  in  time  to  assess  whether  the  commitments  meet  the 
Commission's concerns is at the time when the decision is adopted”, E. de Smijter and L. Kjoelbye, ibidem, p. 




here are in fact the enforcement benefits of the adopted commitment decision which would 
irremediably be lost or seriously compromised. 
Not having to ponder the proposed commitments in light of a possible infringement decision 
also  entails  that  the  Commission  may  in  principle  make  commitments  binding  which  go 
beyond what it may have imposed on the same undertaking by way of an Article 7 decision. 
This  important  consequence  is  known  to  the  ECJ,  for  which  undertakings  offering 
commitments  “consciously  accept”  that  their  concessions  may  exceed  the  scope  of  an 
Article 7  decision  and  yet  represent  a  more  desirable  outcome  than  the  finding  of  an 
infringement and an additional fine.
53 
What counts for the purposes of the proportionality test is of course not the perspective of the 
undertakings, but that of the Commission. It is undeniable that the Commissio n, if given a 
chance  to  extract  more  concessions  from  an  undertaking  trying  to  avoid  a  possible 
infringement decision and so achieve better enforcement results, would be tempted to obtain 
as much as it can. 
As reported by some commentators,
54 the outcome of the Coca-Cola case
55 would provide a 
good example of this modus operandi. There, the Commission accepted and made binding 
commitments concerning geographic and product markets not covered by the investigation.
56 
The possibility that the Commission could have adopted an infringement decision having the 
same scope as its Article 9 decision can be reasonably excluded. Whereas before  Alrosa 
legitimate  doubts  might  have  been  raised  as  to  the  lawfulness  of  similar  commitment 
decisions, now that the ECJ has qualified the extent of a possible Article 7 decision as totally 
irrelevant  and  that  the  Commission‟s  assessment  can  be  challenged  only  for  “manifest 
incorrectness”, the room for judicial review seems considerably reduced to the benefit of the 
Commission‟s discretionary power. 
The recurring remark in the judgment of the ECJ that the tools provided in Article 7 and 
Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 have different characteristics and pursue different enforcement 
objectives
57 is also a valid argument to conclude that any supposed preference for behavioural 
over structural commitments
58 is not justified. In practice, should the undertaking concerned 
spontaneously offer structural commitments, the Commission would then be dispensed from 
seeking behavioural commitments capable of addressing its concerns to the same extent. 
More generally, the fact that the ECJ does not expect the Commission to take the initiative to 
suggest less onerous – whilst always adequate – commitments to the undertakings concerned 
puts the Commission in the best position it could have wished for itself. Since judicial review 
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  ECJ Alrosa, § 48. 
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  S. Rab, D. Monnoyeur and A. Sukhtankar,  Commitments in EU Competition Cases. Article 9 of Regulation 
1/2003, its application and the challenges ahead, Journal of European Competition Law and Practice, 2010, 
Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 181. 
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  See footnote 14. 
56
  In particular, notwithstanding the fact that the investigation concerned four Member States, the commitments 
did potentially extend to all Member States provided certain market conditions were met. 
57
  The Commission‟s obligations flowing from the observance of the principle of proportionality under each of 
these two provisions are thus different also. 
58
  Which would mirror  the priority rule applicable to the remedies that may be imposed by way of an 




is  limited  to  manifest  errors  of  assessment,  which  are  very  hard  to  establish,  the 
Commission‟s discretionary power after Alrosa is as a result impressively wide. 
Throughout the commitment operations and in line with its priorities, the Commission is free 
to play a proactive role, de facto adjusting, relaunching and soliciting those commitments that 
best suit its enforcement objectives, and yet as a result it is de iure responsible for checking 
that the commitments spontaneously offered by the undertaking in question do adequately 
meet its competition concerns. In so doing, as we have seen, the Commission may even push 
to obtain commitments going beyond the remedies that it would be able to impose by issuing 
an infringement decision instead, or formulate its competition concerns at the time of the 
preliminary  assessment  after  having  already  negotiated  in  advance  the  commitments  that 
would address them in the Article 9 decision, so turning upside-down the normal course of 
events. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
If this reading of the situation following the ECJ ruling in the Alrosa case is correct, then 
there is no reason to think that the Commission‟s output of Article 9 decisions will decline in 
the near future. On the contrary, the increased recourse to commitment decisions observed 
over recent years seems likely to continue, as the generous boundaries set by the ECJ to the 
Commission‟s marge de manoeuvre appear capable of encouraging this trend further. 
It is therefore for the Commission to manage the Article 9 instrument properly, so as to 
eliminate any concerns that it may somehow abuse its vast discretionary power.
59 Besides, 
given the threshold established in Alrosa for challenging any such possible “abuse”, i.e., the 
manifest incorrectness of the Commission‟s assessment, nearly all hopes of avoiding system 
failures
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  As  early  as  2005,  one  author  had  pointed  out  “some  concerns  that  Art. 9  Decisions  may  become  an 
instrument to impose obligations that go far beyond European competition law as it stands, and the wording 
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commitment decisions – unanswered questions on Article 9 decisions, E.C.L.R. 2005, 26(8), p. 451. 
60
  A possible system failure would in particular occur should the Commission try to explore the commitment 
route when not in possession of a strong competition case, with a view to achieving some result. An 
appropriate selection at the time of the initial  assessment, aimed at pursuing cases where it is highly likely 
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61
  One author offers a different perspective:  “the  responsibility  for  avoiding  disproportionate  commitment 
decisions will lie in the first place with the companies concerned. It is for them to refuse commitments that 
go beyond what is required to solve the competitive concerns raised and to offer altenative, less onerous 
remedies”, M. Kellerbauer, Playground instead of playpen: the Court of Justice of the European Union’s 
Alrosa judgment on art. 9 of Regulation 1/2003, E.C.L.R. 2011, 32(1), p. 8. 